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CONTROL PROBLEMS IN DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS: EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE OF MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTIONS
LOS PROBLEMAS DE CONTROL EN LOS CANALES DE DISTRIBUCIÓN: EVIDENCIA
EMPÍRICA DE LA CONTRIBUCIÓN DE LOS SISTEMAS DE CONTROL DE GESTIÓN
ABSTRACT
As part of the supply chain, manufacturing firms are increasingly placing greater emphasis on
the management of their outsourced distribution channels (DCs). However, the role that inter-
organizational Management Control Systems (MCS) can play in managing DC problems is still not
clearly understood. Through an exploratory case study, we show how intra-organizational control
problems persist in an inter-organizational context, rooted in informational asymmetries and
conflicts of interest and aggravated by interdependencies. Likewise, the case study illustrates the
way in which MCS assists the manufacturing firm to communicate to its representatives what the
organization wants from them, motivating them and transferring capabilities. Thus, MCS can help
to complement and re-orientate inter-firm agreements and constitutes a key tool for managing
DCs in a flexible way. 
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RESUMEN
Como parte de la cadena de suministros, las empresas productoras están poniendo mayor énfasis
en la gestión de sus canales de distribución externalizados (DCs). Sin embargo, aún no existe una
clara comprensión sobre el papel que los Sistemas de Control de Gestión inter-organizativos
(MCS) pueden desarrollar en la gestión de los problemas de los DCs. A través de un estudio de
caso, se muestra cómo los problemas de control intra-organizativos persisten en un contexto
inter-organizativo, causados por las asimetrías informativas y el conflicto de intereses, y
agravándose por las interdependencias. Asimismo, se expone cómo los MCS ayudan a la empresa
productora a comunicar a sus distribuidores lo que la organización desea de ellos, motivándolos
y capacitándolos. De esta forma, los MCS pueden ayudar a completar y redirigir acuerdos entre
firmas y constituir una herramienta clave en la gestión flexible de los DCs. 
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, supply chain management has emerged as a key to success in the global
economy. As a part of the supply chain, an outsourced distribution channel (DC) is configured as
a non-equity contractual alliance, in which an upstream manufacturer externalises part of its
value chain to a set of downstream independent intermediaries - representatives - (Stern, El-
Ansary and Coughlan, 1996). In this sense, a DC comprises a set of exchanges and ongoing
relationships, which facilitate and simplify distribution activities, thereby achieving greater
efficiency, improvements in client satisfaction and cost savings (Cepeda, 2003). Savings derived
from avoiding complicated administrative and control mechanisms are usually highlighted among
the advantages of DCs (Anderson and Oliver, 1987). 
In most DCs, manufacturers offer a contract that tries to control the representatives’ rewards, based
on measurable results, normally on sales (Frazier, 1999). However, although DC members are
interdependent and cooperative, they may pursue different, even contradictory, goals (Lassar and
Kerr, 1996); and contracts are often described as incomplete (Baiman and Rajan, 2002) giving rise
to informational asymmetries (Bergen, Dutta and Walker, 1992). In this sense, a DC can be defined
as an agency relationship (Bergen, Dutta and Walker, 1992), where their members tend to make
decisions under limited rationality situations, because it is difficult to collect and understand all
the existent market information (Stern, El-Ansary and Coughlan, 1996). In fact, inter-organizational
management control systems (MCS) - defined as all the devices or systems that one party uses to
motivate other parties to achieve desirable or predetermined outcomes (Dekker 2004) - could help
to control third parties, mitigating the incomplete nature of contracts and creating more cooperative
relationships among the members in inter-organizational relationships, as proposed by Baiman and
Rajan (2002). However, despite calls to integrate insights from management accounting and
marketing management (Roslender and Hart, 2003), the role which MCS can play in DC
management is by no means fully understood (Frazier, 1999; Nunlee, 2005).
This paper contributes to spanning this gap by exploring the control problems that can persist in a
DC and the potential contributions of MCS in their management. To grasp the complexity of DCs,
we adopted an exploratory case study approach (Yin, 1989). We chose the successful and long-
standing relationship between a manufacturing firm, the leading firm in the relationship that is
referred to as CMD (an assumed name), and its DC. During the period of study (1998-2004), as part
of its externalisation strategy, CMD opted to introduce various MCS tools, which now make up its
actual inter-organizational MCS. We study a series of events in the course of the relationship from
the manufacturer's perspective because, in this case, it is CMD that delegates its activities and
develops the inter-organizational MCS in order to increase the likelihood of gaining its objectives. 
Our paper makes several contributions to existing literature. First, in contrast to existing research
in marketing (Anderson and Oliver, 1987) and in management control (Merchant, 1985) which
defend the idea that when firms outsource some functions to third parties, they avoid these
control problems, we identify - applying Merchant and Van der Stede’s (2003) framework coupled
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with an agency theory approach - persistent control problems in an inter-organizational context
that are rooted in informational asymmetries and conflicts of interest and are aggravated by
interdependencies. Second, as opposed to the rigidity of contracts, we study how inter-
organizational MCS constitute a key tool for managing DCs, completing and re-driving inter-firm
agreements in a flexible way. Contemplating different aspects of the literature on marketing and
management, we show that the integration and coordination of DCs can be achieved through
MCS. Third, Frazier (1999) points out that MCS is a real topic and a research stream in DC
management. Our work reveals insights that facilitate MCS development, where it contemplates
the way in which each MCS type might contribute to the solution of different problems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines the theoretical framework, and
focuses on control problems while contemplating an agency view of DCs and MCS types, in order to
develop our research questions. Then, we go on to describe the methodology, the antecedents of the
relationship between the manufacturing firm and the DC, and the development of MCS over time. We
offer an analysis in the discussion section, and end with some conclusions and implications. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Merchant and Van der Stede (2003) define three control problems in an intra-organizational
context that can occur simultaneously:  1. Lack of direction: when employees do not know what
the organization expects from them; 2. Motivational problems: when employees and
organizational objectives do not naturally coincide, and employees are self-interested; and 3.
Personal limitations: when employees are simply unable to do an adequate job because of certain
personal limitations (person-specific problems or lack of knowledge, training, experience, or
information). These authors indicate that managers can avoid the control problems with a
particular activity by turning over the potential profits, and the associated risks, to a third party
through such mechanisms as subcontracts, or licensing agreements (Merchant, 1985 p. 8).
Elimination is typically utilized by managers who are not able to control certain activities,
perhaps because they do not have the required resources or because they do not have a good
understanding of the required processes (Merchant, 1985 p. 8). 
On this point, the literature discussing DCs has defended manufacturers that choose to sell their
products through independent firms whenever establishing their own distribution would entail
excessive costs or risks (Stern, El-Ansary and Coughlan, 1996). Outsourced DCs reduce physical
resource needs (warehouses, centres, etc.), minimize specialised personnel hiring, and permit the
sharing of inventory costs. Independent representatives not only favour cost and investment
reductions, they also enhance market knowledge and relationships with final clients, offering
greater market flexibility and stability. Moreover, fully-owned distribution channels require
investment by the manufacturer in administrative systems to control their own activities. These
systems may generate such high costs that the manufacturer chooses to avoid them by outsourcing
the distribution function (Anderson and Oliver, 1987).  
Control Problems in Distribution Channels
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However, once the DC is outsourced, risk and vulnerability may increase for the manufacturer
(Frazier and Antia, 1995). As Mishra, Heide and Cort (1998) argued, DCs can be understood as a
set of multi-level agency relationships, because manufacturing firms face problems in their
relationships with their DCs that parallel those faced by the representatives in their client
relationships. Klein and Murphy (1988) highlights that the manufacturer relies on independent
representatives to supply some services to end clients. However, the client often cannot evaluate the
accurate product quality, and the manufacturer cannot easily monitor the representative. Therefore,
there are two levels of asymmetric information that engender two agency relationships. Our research
work focuses on the manufacturer –principal– and representatives –agents– relationship.
Stern, El-Ansary and Coughlan (1996) established three conflict sources in DCs: (1) goal
incongruence. (2) Competence discrepancy, due to interdependencies; when the manufacturer
perceives that the representatives are irreplaceable due to their close relationship with the
clients, their accumulated knowledge or because their experience is too valuable to lose. As
Stern, El-Ansary and Coughlan (1996) argued, the sales volume is a good measure of
interdependency levels. (3) Different perceptions of the reality can provoke informational
asymmetries; the manufacturing firm might hold private information on its products’ strategic
value, or information about its future evolution and demand (Maskin and Tirole, 1992), which
affects the representatives’ future revenues. On the other hand, due to their direct contact with
and closeness to the clients, the representatives can observe details relating to product demands
that the manufacturer cannot. Furthermore, the manufacturer may be unable to detect (even
though it may suspect) that a certain representative is engaging in opportunistic behaviour or is
not delivering the proper services to the end clients. It may be further aggravated by the
influence that bad representative service can have on the manufacturer’s reputation. 
In the light of these arguments, and in contrast to the literature on DCs (Anderson and Oliver,
1987) and intra-organizational management control (Merchant, 1985), which seem to indicate
that the manufacturers’ need to control can decrease in DCs, we might question whether control
problems (lack of direction, motivational problems and personal limitations) disappear when
distribution functions are outsourced. Interdependencies, conflicting objectives and bi-
directional informational asymmetry could damage DC efficiency (Bergen, Dutta and Walker,
1992; Lassar and Kerr, 1996), provoking the control problems’ translation towards inter-
organizational control problems. Thus, we set out as a first research question (see Figure 1):
Do intra-organizational control problems persist in outsourced DC as a result of
agency problems? 
If the control problems are not eliminated it is necessary to manage them (Merchant, 1985),
encouraging representatives to use their abilities, knowledge and information in the
manufacturer’s best interests. In theory, manufacturers have a range of contractual options to
manage their DCs. According to Sass and Gisser (1989), exclusive intermediation contracts,
associated with commission-based retributions, allow the manufacturer to reduce agency costs.
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However, contracts are often described as incomplete (Baiman and Rajan, 2002), where all future
contingencies cannot be envisaged, or are costly or impossible to contract, so contracts never
fully reflect working DC relationships. As stated by Baiman and Rajan (2002), the inefficiency
of incomplete contracts might be mitigated when the relationship between members becomes
inherently more cooperative. 
Baiman and Rajan (2002) propose that MCS might help to control inter-organizational
relationships, reducing the degree of contract incompleteness. In this sense, only recently have
researchers begun to consider that MCS design spans traditional organizational boundaries.
According to Langfield-Smith and Smith (2003), a useful starting point in studying MCS in inter-
organizational contexts is to consider them as MCS within a single firm. Maintaining the former
analytical framework, Merchant and Van der Stede (2003) propose the establishment of different
MCS types to solve control problems:
Results controls require: 1. Definition of the dimensions in which results are desired, such
as efficiency, quality or service; 2. Measurement of the performance in these dimensions;
and 3. Provision of rewards (or punishment) to encourage (or discourage) the behaviours that
leads to (or hinders) those results. 
Action controls try to ensure that desired actions are carried out, or to avoid undesired ones.
Their main advantage is that they are the most direct form of control, as they direct attention
to actions, as well as being an efficient way of assisting coordination. However, an excellent
knowledge of actions normally calls for very routine tasks or actions that are easily
supervised, thus curbing creativity, innovation and adaptation. 
Personnel-cultural controls emphasise trust, self-monitoring and social or group pressures.
The principal methods of implementing these are: selection and placement of employees;
training; and job design and provision of necessary resources; codes of conduct; intra-
organizational transfers; social arrangements; and tone at the top. 
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TABLE 1.- MERCHANT AND VAN DER STEDE´S FRAMEWORK
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According to Merchant and Van der Stede (2003, p. 218), not every type of control is appropriate
for all kinds of control problems (see Table 1). For example, results controls are particularly apt
for the management of motivational problems, and can also be used to inform people about what
is expected of them. However, they are not effective in managing personnel limitations. Through
action controls, MCS seek to ensure appropriate management, at the same time as they facilitate
an objective evaluation offering objective measures, training, and associating positive or negative
stimuli with certain behaviours, allowing for reactions at later stages. In order to strike a balance
between execution, effort and its rewards, it is necessary to communicate expectations clearly
through the establishment of objectives, appropriate behaviour and proper evaluation.
Furthermore, personnel controls favour training, seeking to create opportunities so that people
may show their true abilities. Together with appropriate compensation systems and the
transmission of the organization's cultural values, personnel controls also permit alignment of
objectives, reducing the likelihood of moral hazard. On the other hand, the importance of the
cultural transmission, as a control mechanism, arises from the substitution of individual
objectives for organizational objectives. 
Following Baiman and Rajan’s (2002) proposal, and transposing Merchant and Van der Stede’s
(2003) arguments into an inter-organizational context, after analysing whether control problems
persist in DCs, we ask ourselves whether inter-organizational MCS contribute to solving such
problems and whether the contribution of each MCS type might depend on the relevance of each
control problem. This leads us to establish our second research question (see Figure 1): 
To what extent do each of the MCS types contribute to the management of persistent
control problems in outsourced DCs?
Control problemsAgency problems Control types
Interdependencies
Research question 1
Informational asymmetries
Goal incongruences
Lack of direction
Motivational problems
Personal limitations
Action control
Result control
Personnel control
Research question 2
FIGURE 1.- PROPOSED THEORETICAL MODEL
CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY
In order to find the answers to our research questions, we have adopted an exploratory case study
approach (Yin, 1989), examining the relationship between a manufacturing firm, called CMD (an
assumed name), and its DC (formed by a set of 176 small representatives). Three factors have
influenced our rationale for selecting CMD as our research site. Firstly, the DC is longstanding and
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stable. CMD has used this DC for more than twenty years, and, in 2004, over 97 percent of the
representatives had been part of the DC for over five years. Secondly, the DC is successful (as
demanded by Kaplan, 1983), as it currently generates more than 75% of sales and caters to 90% of
clients. It is highlighted that CMD’s ROI from its DC is 3.4 times higher than from direct sales.
Thirdly, during the period of study, 1998-2004, CMD unilaterally opted to introduce various control
tools, which currently make up its inter-organizational MCS to control its multiple representatives. 
In line with Yin’s (1989) suggestions, we followed three principles in order to improve the
reliability and the validity of our findings: using multiple sources of evidence, creating a case
study database, and maintaining a chain of evidence. The information necessary to establish and
analyse the chain of events was obtained from published data concerning CMD, internal
documents, direct observations, visits to work centres and 24 in-depth interviews with key
managers (of an average length of 180 minutes). Dating back to 1985, extensive, detailed archival
data revealed the chronology of MCS development, as well as their objectives and content,
substantiating information obtained from interviews. The main archival sources included the
different types of contracts, the representatives' evaluation system results, minutes of all the
regular joint meetings, and projects and procedures documents. Supplementary archival data
contained a wide volume of management reports, financial and sales reports, improvement
project reports, and internal and external newsletters. Interviews enabled us to gather the
perceptions and expectations of individual managers, and served to triangulate our findings.
Taking  the literature on MCS and DCs as a base, we developed guidelines for semi-structured
interviews to gain more information on topics whose clarification would be particularly
interesting for the study; and to complete and contrast information previously gathered by tapping
the wealth of experience of those people who had a direct or an indirect relation to the
introduction of MCS. All interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed, and the completed
write-ups were sent to the interviewees to ensure their accuracy. We also carried out direct
observations at the head office and work centres. Furthermore, we attended four of the annual
meetings that CMD holds for its representatives (from 2001 to 2004). Our presence meant that
we could listen to employees’ observations about the roles and objectives of MCS. 
Once the data collection was finalized, we carefully analysed the interview transcripts to understand
areas of agreements between interviewees. Archival data were used to confirm issues that arose in
interviews and from direct observations. Then, a table was designed to reorganize the original
transcripts around issues of significance in order to assist our understanding of the roles, content and
objectives of MCS in the DC. Focusing on ‘what led to what, and when’ (Miles and Huberman, 1994,
p. 110), we traced seven events during which MCS development might be discerned. 
CMD and Distribution Channel backgrounds
CMD was established in the late nineteenth century. It is currently the leading firm in the
Spanish industrial chemical sector and belongs to a multinational group. This sector is
characterized by a relatively stable market, in which five giant companies share most of the world
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markets. CMD is organized into regional districts, and its activity is basically commercial,
although it also carries out the packaging of its products. Industrial chemical products are sold,
in containers, directly to major clients or through the DC to a large number of small and medium
clients. While delivery sales are carried out through the DC, CMD bills the client directly. CMD’s
containers are a main asset, often out-valuing the cost of their contents. The management of these
containers is a key issue; they are an important source of income, since daily rent is charged to
the client, and they must be collected for reuse.
Practically from its outset, CMD delegated the tasks of warehousing and transport, for two
primary reasons: logistic costs and in an attempt to attend a great number of geographically
small clients dispersed around the market. Gradually CMD regularized the contractual
framework of the relationship, focusing on its legal and labour aspects. From 1985 onwards,
only one contract type was used for these independent entities, regardless of their varying
sizes, legal constitutions, and other business activities. An analysis of the contract shows that
it does not envisage every possible contingency. It is a starting point which outlines the legal
relationship and those parts of the business that are delegated (geographical areas) as well as
economic conditions. 
Pre-existing contract representatives were remunerated in different ways: by fees per container
in storage or sold, by remittance of a fixed monthly sum for storage or sales, or by reimbursement
of expenses. This fact stimulated the need to link the services provided by representatives to the
final product price. CMD took advantage of the newly introduced contracts to establish a single
system of remuneration: commissions on sales. From that moment onwards, the representatives
accepted the products on consignment, operated exclusively in a given geographical area and
received commissions on area sales, even though on occasions CMD delivered the product
directly to the client. 
CMD’s commercial department was established in the late 1980s, to take charge of direct sales
and customer attention. CMD assigned a commercial department staff member to each group of
representatives, who was then responsible for supervising all of these representatives’ activities.
Through visits to the geographical areas, the commercial department staff member could test
client satisfaction and so establish whether the representative was performing well. 
CMD’s industrial products do not differ from those of its competitors; its main added value is its
working approach with the DC, as the representatives supply the clients with a satisfactory
standard of service. This fact has prompted its parent company to draw up a plan, named “CMD
style”, to implement in the rest of Europe. 
In order to maintain the chain of evidence, we present the case study in the following two sections
that are of interest to our study: (1) chronological development of the MCS; and (2) CMD’s
perception of its results. 
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CHRONOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MCS 
1998. Electronic integration
CMD installed computers and shared software in all its representatives’ centres, delegating new
functions (through passwords, representatives can create and maintain client files, access
information on price discounts, monitor clients’ inventory, manage logistics, receive complaints
and control outstanding payments) that increased its degree of externalization. “We needed
systems that, by allocating responsibility for the assigned functions [to Distribution channel
members], would allow us to keep some control over the market” (District Director). The aim was
to homogenize tasks, improve control over activities, eliminate duplicated functions (mainly
administrative), and reduce its inventory level. “It liberated us from an important administrative
work-load; we gained in speed and reliability of data, and client complaints dropped” (Client
Attention Centre Manager). Therefore, CMD was able to keep track of its containers, on-line
allocation of inventory among the representatives and gain information on final clients. “It gives
us greater efficiency, even though the channel model is more costly” (former CMD CEO).
1999. Shared information project
CMD began to issue reports with commercial management information with the aim of: (i)
obtaining better knowledge of the evolution of its clients; (ii) planning and solving problems more
quickly; (iii) coordinating their work with the commercial department (Project Report). As CMD’s
managers comment, it provided the representatives with the necessary information to improve
their sales activities and included falls in demand, registration of new clients, container
contracts, sales analyses contrasted with the previous year, itemised sales breakdowns and the
total number of containers per client. “Preparing tools to help them out, we told them that the
clients should be managed, and asked them to take responsibility for doing so” (Representatives
Manager). This information was commented upon each month by the commercial staff, which
enabled them to establish sales objectives. 
1999. Representatives’ marketing plan 
This plan was based on four pillars: 
{a} Representatives profile. CMD defines the characteristics it seeks in
representatives: (i) a firm operating in industrial supplies; (ii) good knowledge of their
area; (iii) a good reputation; and (iv) having other related business (Representatives’
marketing plan report). “We've consolidated our channel. We defined what the channel
type should be and described how they [representatives] should work. This takes us to
the following step, to evaluate the channel on the basis of this definition” (former
Representatives Manager).
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{b} Representatives control scorecard. The previous shared information project prompted
the establishment of a computer application. New information was added that allowed for the
monitoring of the representatives’ objectives. Although representatives already had access to
the same information (through client invoice copies), the computer format was better organized
and more detailed. “It's a support tool where each representative's situation is analysed, and
it provides a great amount of information... Our channel members have speedy access to
information that allows them to develop their work in a more coordinated, effective, rapid and
satisfactory way” (Representatives control scorecard report). In most cases, this information
even improved commercial department activities by providing an extra management tool.
{c} Representatives database. This tool gathered information on the different areas and on
the functions of the representatives (e.g., sales, commissions, degree of dedication, number of
sales personnel, number of delivery trucks, client attention hours, average period of payments,
etc.). It facilitates comparisons and analysis of representatives’ results and their evolution. 
{d} Representatives meetings. With the aim of communicating, training, integrating, and
aligning actions, these meetings dealt with such aspects as results and budgets (both CMD’s
and DC’s), commercial and pricing policies, annual targets and representatives’
improvement plans, marketing campaigns, technical and logistics matters, as well as
administrative issues. “It was necessary to stimulate communication and everyone had to
receive the same message because not all the commercial staff can or want to communicate
things in the same way” (Commercial Director). Moreover, CMD used these meetings to
provide training on new activities (e.g. transport laws, new product introductions, trade
fairs, and new computer programs). 
1999. Representatives’ satisfaction survey
CMD initiated a two-level satisfaction survey to identify weak points and develop new projects
that would enhance the relationship. Groups surveyed were: 1. Final clients: to assess the
standard of services offered by representatives to clients; and 2. Representatives: to evaluate the
level of services supplied by CMD. 
2000. Representatives manual 
This manual set out the procedures to follow in all activities relating to storage, distribution,
administration, and commercialization, as well as templates of documents and forms both for
internal use and for the final client. 
2001. RES project: Representatives Evaluation System
The RES had two objectives: to reward those who obtain the best results and to pinpoint those who
need more assistance in order to pre-empt possible conflicts. “It has provided us with objective
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information to understand how our channel was doing” (Sales Manager). Analysing the DC chain
value, CMD defined 37 performance measures (including financial and non-financial, internal and
external measures), their relative weights and the desired level of development. “Before we (also) had
sales data, but we could not foresee the appropriate management approach, the potential of the area.
We had data but it was dispersed. Now we've got them together and they're shared by both parties”
(Client Attention Centre Manager). It was a continuous improvement system, the principal goal of
which was to enhance commercial activities. In this way, CMD can now detect shortfalls, item by
item, representative by representative, in order to implement the pertinent personal objectives. 
2002-03. RES results 
Through the RES, CMD has obtained a ranking of its representatives every year, rewarding best
performances, accompanying it with an incentives plan. According to interviews, it is the first
step towards a more sophisticated compensation system. The results obtained from 2002 to 2003
reflect a notable improvement in representative and client satisfaction levels. In 2003, CMD
changed its incentives system to an award system based on the RES. It established the
“commitment award, for those representatives who exceeded the average evaluation” and the
“excellence award for those who surpassed the commitment level”.
CMD´s assessment of its distribution channel management
All our interviewees comment that the DC has evolved into a more complex entity, and that inter-
organizational MCS have allowed the outsourcing of new administrative and commercial tasks.
Nowadays, more outputs arising from manufacturing activities are translated into inputs for
representatives’ activities and vice versa, requiring a better fit between a wider range of
manufacturer and representative operations. Besides dependence on the storage, delivery and
collection of products and containers, in other words the increase in outsourced tasks makes
CMD more dependent on the representatives. “The DC is a fundamental piece in our structure,
they're the ones that speak to the clients, giving our image and service” (Sales manager).
“They´re a powerful tool to get closer to the dispersed clients, giving them proper attention that
we could not give, or that would be excessively expensive” (CMD Director). Furthermore,
according to CMD’s managers, a bad DC service could provoke higher costs. As the
Representatives Manager argued, “the advantage of the commission system is that it's simple.
The drawback is that it doesn't motivate the representatives properly. It draws them towards the
bigger clients, more commission for less work”. 
However, with the introduction of these inter-organizational MCS, CMD personnel felt that they had
obtained sufficient control over the DC. The new MCS have improved communication and there is
an ongoing adjustment between them, managing these higher interdependencies. MCS have brought
about operating improvements, greater efficiency in terms of externalization of functions, lower
personnel and structural costs, greater control of stock, containers and the end market, the
optimization of delivery routes, and the ability to track assets. CMD values the MCS contribution in
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aligning the objectives of both parties, remunerating representatives not only through commission on
sales. With the new MCS tools, CMD guides the DC towards the right service and, at the same time,
increases the flow of objective information that allows them to monitor the outsourced activities. The
Representatives Manager remarked, “It was simply not correct to have so little information with
which to monitor representatives”. This MCS development has not yet concluded, as several
interviewees pointed out “We want to include them more fully in our value chain” (CMD Director).
Likewise, since 1999 (see Figure 2), CMD shows an ongoing increase in sales. While there was
a positive trend in the macro-economic market itself, most of interviewees consider that sales
have increased over the average as a consequence of MCS development on the DC management.
MCS has focused the representatives’ attention on sales and commercial tasks, improving their
activities. According to the interviews, it has allowed the development of a premium prices
policy, maintaining market share, and the introduction of new client services supplied by the
agents (services which are billed by CMD to the final clients). MCS development has also freed
commercial staff of administrative and more routine sales tasks and it has given them time to
dedicate to other commercial functions (e.g., development of new product applications, attention
to strategic clients) improving the positive sales evolution.  But, at the same time, all of these
make CMD sales more easily influenced by representatives’ behaviour and activities. 
CMD sales evolution, 1996-2002
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FIGURE 2.- CMD SALES EVOLUTION, 1996-2002
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
Before our study period the DC tasks were simple, so the MCS used by the manufacturer were
basic ones that are commonplace in DC management (Stern El-Ansary and Coughlan, 1996): the
contract, the commission system and direct supervision. In this setting the manufacturer
developed the MCS in a homogeneous way across the entire channel. In this section, we first
discuss how each control problem is rooted in agency problems. We then go on to analyse how
each MCS type manages specific control problems. 
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Control problems rooted in Agency problems 
We found that the control problems defined by Merchant and Van der Stede (2003) for an intra-
firm context persisted in the outsourced DCs and, as agency theory predicts, that these control
problems were rooted in informational asymmetries and pervasive conflicts, aggravated by
interdependencies (see Figure 3). 
Lack of direction: The DC was characterized by bi-directional asymmetries of information
despite reaching the benefits recognized in the literature (see Anderson and Oliver, 1987;
Stern, El-Ansary and Coughlan, 1996). Earlier MCS did not allow CMD access to private
information regarding representatives’ behaviour, or knowledge. Its relationship with the DC
was heterogeneous, with some different problems (legal, labour, and compensation). In 1985,
CMD had tried to manage its DC developing an exclusive intermediary contract, in order to
establish the main obligations and rights of the members, and the services’ retribution through
a fixed percentage of commission on the sales. However, the contract was incomplete; the
interviewees view was that the contract is only the beginning and that it should be completed
with other mechanisms. While many aspects of production, transport, and marketing were
centrally planned and controlled, the new key operations of the representatives provoke
greater interdependence and were seen to require more control. This was made even more
acute because controlling the final market was a critical aspect of CMD’s control over assets
(containers). In this respect, CMD depended on the information reported by representatives,
whether manually or digitally. The commodity nature of CMD’s products meant the company
sought to add value to its sales method through its DC. CMD had dependencies on
representatives’ performance (Stern, El-Ansary and Coughlan, 1996), as is shown by the
percentages of DC sales volume, which highlights the need for it to invest in administrative
systems to manage the outsourced activities and to increase the representatives’ commitment,
in contrast to the argument advanced by Anderson and Oliver (1987). A lack of direction
became apparent because neither the contract nor the commercial department could
communicate to the representatives exactly what CMD expected of them. Furthermore, direct
supervision by the commercial department was the only link between CMD and
representatives, a situation that often led to misinterpretation, oversight, or loss of information.
Given the commercial staff’s limited capacity for monitoring (Celly and Frazier, 1996),
representatives could shirk or behave opportunistically. 
Motivational problems. In a similar way to Gietzmann’s (1995) example, CMD perceives that
when giving  its clients’ portfolio to its representatives and supporting them through its
commercial employees, DC members have a fixed remuneration to face their costs of
distribution, enabling bad representatives in good areas to obtain large commissions, and
vice versa. The DC can, due to lack of goal congruence, undertake an action in an
inefficient way or provide distorted information, and these situations will affect CMD
reputation, due to the higher dependencies. CMD detects that the current retribution system
does not provide representatives with the necessary incentives to confront new risks and
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opportunities, that is to say, it detects that representatives can be satisfied with the
maintenance of the current client portfolio, dedicating no further efforts to the search of new
market opportunities. Furthermore, the commission system also failed to motivate container
collection, so CMD could not meet its targets for container rotation. This problem of moral
risk can be heightened by the fact that the representatives, although they are exclusive in
the commercialization of their products, can also carry out other economic activities. Thus,
the potential for opportunistic behaviours arises, when the representative neither makes the
necessary effort, nor acts in the clients’ interest. CMD detects the tendency of some
representatives to pay attention only to those more profitable, high-volume clients. This
problem was aggravated when a client made an urgent order that the representative had to
fulfil, even though the cost of supplying the service outweighed the commission. The
consignment system and the fixed percentage commission failed to transmit sales risk to the
representatives, because the contract was exclusive to a given geographical area and CMD’s
industry was a stable oligopoly. Traditionally, CMD had trusted in contracts, in the direct
supervision of its commercial staff and in remuneration by means of a fixed percentage of
commission on the sale, but it is unable to evaluate the quality of the service that is exactly
being given to its clients. 
Personal limitations: CMD took its first steps towards hiring representatives by recruiting
existing logistic firms that already acted as deliverers and depositaries of its products.
Considering the dynamic nature of the relationship towards a more complex and
interdependent agreement, the contract process (in the mid 1980s) presented an actual
problem of adverse selection and moral hazard, because some representatives lacked
training, resources, and capacity in order to fulfil the new tasks (administrative and
commercial). At the same time, CMD detected that representatives did not have the proper
information to manage their geographical areas and client portfolio.
MCS type contributions to the management of DC control problems
Chiefly from 1998, CMD opted to create a DC plan to get what Narus and Anderson (1986) would
call proactive management of its relationship. The objectives of the DC were changed to include
administrative, commercial and sales activities, besides warehousing and deliveries tasks. This made
CMD more dependent on, and vulnerable to representatives’ behaviour, meaning it had more to lose,
because of increased risk due to inadequate representative service, as Frazier and Antia (1995)
foresaw. As Figure 3 shows, and according to Merchant and Van der Stede (2003), CMD needed to
introduce MCS that would allow it to guide its representatives in their new functions, to mitigate their
lack of direction. To address motivational problems, CMD needed mechanisms that would stimulate
target achievement. To mitigate personal limitations, CMD required mechanisms that would supply
representatives with resources and information. That is, CMD gradually (1) formalized procedures for
action control purposes; (2) developed more complex information systems to control results; and (3)
developed personnel-cultural controls.
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(1) Action controls: The new MCS tools (electronic integration, the shared information project,
the representatives’ marketing plan, satisfaction surveys, and the representatives’ manual) fully
enabled direct supervision by its commercial department (see Table 2), defining and
communicating acceptable limits of desired actions, solving lack of direction problems. In this
way, CMD supplied its commercial staff with the necessary tools to act on a more solid
information base, which in turn helped them to correct representatives’ behaviour. The company
also gave representatives the tools and information needed to improve their activities by solving
personal limitations and motivating them, which increased their commitment to joint actions and
commercial objectives. Moreover, to avoid curbing innovation (Merchant and Van der Stede,
2003), CMD established joint improvement projects to foment creativity and adaptation. This
formalization of action controls was assisted by the fact that externalized services had previously
been carried out by CMD personnel, so the firm managed personnel limitation problems by
transferring its information and its procedures (Lassar and Kerr, 1996). Therefore, CMD
increased its confidence that representatives would act in the desired manner in both former and
new functions, thereby reducing the risk of poor client services.
(2) Result controls: Because the commission system did not provide enough information, did not
guide, motivate and train representatives, as Table 2 shows, the new representatives’ evaluation
Informative asymmetries
Incomplete contract
Agent private information
Misinterpretation, oversight,
or loss of information
Limited capacity for monitoring
Lack of direction
New competences required
Lack of shared information Lack of direction
Motivational problems
Personal limitations
Result control
Representatives evaluation system
Representatives ranking and rewards
Interdependencies
New key activities
Containers collection
Commodity products
Percentages of sales volume
Action control
Electronic integration
Shared information project
Representatives Mk plan
Satisfaction surveys
Management Manual
Evaluation system
Improvement projects
Personnel control
Shared information project
Representatives Mk plan
Satisfaction surveys
Training programs
Goal incongruence
Relatively fixed remuneration
Containers collection
Other economic activities
Tendency to seek out bigger clients
Urgent order costs
Stable oligopoly
FIGURE 3.- CASE-STUDY RESULTS
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system complemented it. These new MCS provided direction, communicating the proper actions,
helping to define the results that CMD wanted in areas it considered critical (new
commercialization and administrative functions, management of containers and clients), in order
to appraise these areas regularly, to control the stocks and containers, and to establish incentives
and benchmarking systems, with the aim of encouraging behaviour that would bring about the
desired results. As CMD’s managers comment, this evaluation system is a flexible process,
allowing the manufacturer to modify its defined measures (eliminating items, including new ones
or modifying them), as they perceive that they do not present the desired attributes correctly.
Moreover, after detecting the limitations of each representative with the new evaluation system,
CMD set out joint targets, specific training programs, and improvement projects for each one,
managing personal limitation problems. In this sense, CMD persuaded its representatives to
increase their effort in the DC value chain activities, because they responded to both financial
and non-financial stimuli. This policy helped CMD to mitigate motivational problems. 
(3) Furthermore, MCS allowed it to reinforce the personnel-cultural controls. By defining a
profile for new representatives and establishing new lines of communication and training, CMD
created cultural values that sought to align representatives’ objectives. CMD gathered
information on its representatives’ needs through satisfaction surveys, detecting their needs
(Narus and Anderson, 1986), contributing to overcoming personnel limitations, and motivating
them. Training courses, regular meetings, and communication channels help in the adequate
management of the DC, guiding its behaviours and allowing its socialization through inter-firm
transference of CMD objectives and know-how. 
Consequently, MCS development can be explained in terms of the solution it offers to control
problems. CMD managed its contractual agreements to reduce its dependence on representatives
and to mitigate the underlying informational asymmetry, collecting information from
representatives regarding their behaviour, their assets, and the final market, in order to forewarn
of problems, enabling their timely correction. In a flexible way, CMD tried to ensure
representatives’ compliance with its objectives through MCS in order to promote cooperation and
prevent failures. Our findings extend Merchant and Van der Stede’s (2003) statement by showing
that as the relationship grew, its controls evolved towards increasing formalization of procedures
for action control and personnel control, and developing more complex result control systems.
Therefore, MCS types are not substitutes, they complement each other and these combinations
synergistically influence the attainment of manufacturer objectives.   
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TABLE 2.- ANALYSIS OF MCS TYPES DEVELOPMENT IN THE CMD CASE
Events
1998
Electronic integration
Homogenization of processes.
Limitation of actions and
stock controls. Tasks
accountability. Better
informed direct supervision.
Result control Action control Personnel-culturalcontrol
Control problems
1999
Shared information
project
1999 Representatives’
marketing plan
1999
Satisfaction surveys
2000 Representatives’
 Manual
2001 Representatives’
evaluation system
2002
First RES results
It allows representatives to
be guided in a
homogeneous way.
LD MP PL
Establishment of action
responsibility in the given
area.  Better informed direct
supervision. Establishment
of joint sales actions
objectives with commercial
department.
Establishment of action
responsibility in the given
area.  Better informed direct
supervision. Establishment
of joint sales actions
objectives with commercial
department.
Benchmarking database.
Communication platform.
It allows representatives to
be guided in a
homogeneous way; the
establishment of joint
objectives to motivate them;
and the meetings to train
them.
It allows guiding
representatives in a
homogeneous way and the
establishment of joint
objectives to motivate them
to reach it.
Representatives’ profile.
Commercial department
helps and trains
representatives.
Communication platform.
Social commitment.
Shared meetings.
Client satisfaction appraisal. Representatives’
satisfaction and needs
appraisal
It allows representatives to
be guided towards
improvements in their
services and motivates
them by asking about their
needs
Establishment of operational
norms and processes.
It allows representatives to
be guided in a
homogeneous way, by
training them.
Establishment of control
objectives on 37 key value-
chain performance indicators.
Establishment of control
objectives on 37 key
value-chain performance
indicators.
It guides representatives
towards key success
variables and motivates
them through ranking and
rewards.
Representatives
ranking and reward
system
Improvement projects. Specific training
programs.
It guides and trains
representatives in the key
success variables and
motivates them by
acknowledging their
importance
x
x x
x x x
x x
x x x
x x
x x x
LD: Lack of direction
MP: Motivational problems
PL: Personal limitations
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CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
This case study allows us to explore persistent control problems in inter-organizational
relationships and the role of MCS in influencing outsourced DC management. Contrary to
traditional assumptions, we provide evidence that control problems persist in an
interorganizational context. Our findings show how lack of direction, motivational problems and
personal limitations are rooted in DC bi-directional informational asymmetry and conflicting
objectives, both aggravated by the interdependencies caused by the quantity and complexity of
tasks that the manufacturer delegates to the representatives. 
According to the line of argument proposed by Baiman and Rajan (2002), we have found that MCS
contribute to contract completion, and promote a more cooperative and flexible relationship. Our
findings show how MCS types evolved from basic results controls –the classical contract, direct
supervision and sales commission – to include a more sophisticated mix including result, action and
personnel-cultural controls. This gradual development of MCS helps to manage the relationship
with representatives in order to mitigate control problems. MCS mitigate control problems allowing
the manufacturer (1) to communicate to the representatives what the manufacturing firm wants from
them in a standard and formal way; (2) to motivate them; and (3) to transfer capabilities in order to
delegate more tasks, developing a common DC culture. Through MCS stimulated development, the
manufacturer completes and develops the contract in key operational aspects to reach its strategy.
As opposed to the rigidity of contracts, MCS types allow a gradual increase of new outsourced tasks,
modifying the representatives’ commitment to different contingencies in a flexible but formal way,
and achieving, at the same time, a closer relationship with the DC members.  
Besides the theoretical implications, there are also practical aspects of this research. Our
findings offer insights into the types of control problems that can be found in DCs, as they show
how each MCS type can help to mitigate them and to reach a more cooperative relationship. In
spite of these problems, vertically integrating the distribution function is not the only option for
the manufacturer to gain control. However, we must mention that the evidence presented in this
paper is based on a single in-depth study; therefore it would be interesting to analyse other,
possibly contrasting cases. Besides, it would be interesting to complement these results with data
from the representatives’ perspective analysing their perceptions. Likewise, it would be
interesting to analyse its effect on trust, as another key construct in achieving an acceptable
confidence level in supply chain relationships. 
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